The rise of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979 stands as a stark illustration of how progressive intellectuals and political figures can inadvertently serve as enablers of authoritarian regimes. A widely circulated photograph captures this irony: two young women, beneficiaries of the Shah’s modernization reforms—including expanded education and women’s rights—celebrating the fall of the monarchy and the arrival of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. At the time, many Western academics, journalists, and leftist commentators portrayed Khomeini as a progressive, anti-imperialist leader akin to Mahatma Gandhi. Yet, one of those women was later executed by the new regime, and the other was forced into exile.
President Jimmy Carter, whose foreign policy leaned toward human rights and democratic ideals, came to view the Shah’s government as insufficiently democratic and ripe for change. In doing so, the United States withdrew critical support from one of its most reliable allies in the region. Far from being a mere Western puppet, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi pursued a vision of Iranian modernization rooted in national pride, education, infrastructure development, and economic collaboration. Between 1963 and 1977, Iran achieved an average annual GDP growth rate of approximately 10.5 percent, with per capita income rising dramatically. Land reforms, women gained unprecedented rights, and industrialization accelerated. Had this trajectory continued, Iran might well have emerged as one of the world’s ten or eleven largest economies and the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Instead, the Islamic Republic has presided over decades of economic stagnation, repression, and international isolation.
The primary catalyst for this tragedy was not solely the actions of the revolutionaries, but the ideological blindness of much of the Western and Iranian left. By the time many realized they had helped unleash a theocratic dictatorship, it was too late. The 1979–1981 American hostage crisis quickly disabused Carter and others of their illusions. Yet, few on the left have fully acknowledged their role as unwitting facilitators of this outcome. Instead, they have constructed an alternative narrative centered on an earlier figure. His story gave leftists an escape goat. His name is Mohammad Mossadegh.
Mossadegh, who served as prime minister from 1951 to 1953, is frequently invoked as the “democratically elected” leader overthrown by a CIA-orchestrated coup in 1953—an event that supposedly explains Iran’s subsequent authoritarian turn. This portrayal serves as a convenient explanation for the 1979 revolution, deflecting responsibility from the left’s support for Khomeini and placing blame squarely on Western imperialism.
A closer examination reveals significant inaccuracies in this account. Mossadegh was not directly elected by popular vote. Under Iran’s 1906 constitution, the Shah nominated the prime minister, who was then confirmed by the Majlis (parliament). Mossadegh was selected in this manner, following widespread public pressure for oil nationalization. More than twenty previous prime ministers had been appointed through the same process, yet none are described as “democratically elected.”
The Shah himself ascended the throne in 1941—long before the CIA was established—and represented the continuation of a 2,500-year monarchical tradition. His father, Reza Shah, had seized power in the 1920s. In 1953, the Shah exercised his constitutional authority to dismiss Mossadegh, whose policies had brought the country to the brink of economic collapse. Mossadegh had aligned himself with Soviet interests, promised to distribute Iran’s oil revenues to “Islamic nations,” and moved to undermine the monarchy. Domestic opposition was widespread: the military, merchants (bazaaris), and even many clerics supported the Shah.
While Operation Ajax just exploited existing divisions rather than creating them. The Shah’s return from brief exile was driven by broad domestic support, suggesting that his removal of Mossadegh would likely have succeeded even without foreign assistance.
Moreover, the events of 1953 were not a central grievance in 1979. Neither the Islamists nor the leftist groups that drove the revolution frequently invoked Mossadegh as a rallying cry.
Mossadegh’s popularity stemmed primarily from his campaign to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Shah appointed him for a significant reason. Mossadegh’s popularity and public pressure were expected to provide advantage in negotiations with the British to secure a better oil deal. The Shah was pragmatic when it came to handling the economy. When we look at his approach, there is no huge difference from that of legendary leaders like Lee Kuan Yew. He understood that a free-market economy and capitalism are the only proven ways to generate wealth and bring lasting prosperity to a nation. To achieve that, he implemented pragmatic measures throughout his rule—from attracting foreign investment and fostering private enterprise to building modern infrastructure and encouraging industrialization. These policies were designed to integrate Iran into the global economy while maintaining national sovereignty. People are usually not aware of how the economy works or why investments are needed. Leftists, especially Marxists, often exploit this economic ignorance to create unrest in societies, framing legitimate development efforts as exploitation and portraying pragmatic leaders as tools of imperialism. This is exactly what happened in Iran. The ignorance won. Mossadegh framed the issue in emotionally charged terms: Britain was “stealing” Iran’s wealth, and nationalization would deliver immediate prosperity. What was rarely explained was Iran’s lack of technical capacity: the country had no engineers, refineries, tankers, insurance mechanisms, or independent markets to extract, process, transport, or sell its oil. Oil revenues funded the state budget, military, and imports. Nationalization, without these prerequisites, led to a British boycott, a collapse in production (from 242 million barrels in 1950 to 10.6 million in 1952), and near bankruptcy. These crises preceded any significant foreign intervention.
Mossadegh himself came from the Qajar aristocracy, was married into the dynasty, and was one of Iran’s largest landowners. The structural problems he confronted were inherited from the Qajar era and his own social class, yet he reframed them as a moral failing of the monarchy.
In retrospect, the Mossadegh narrative has become a tool for avoiding uncomfortable truths about the 1979 revolution and its consequences. It allows critics of the Shah to downplay his era’s substantial achievements in modernization, education, and economic growth while minimizing criticism of the Islamic Republic’s record of repression and mismanagement.
A more accurate understanding of Iranian history requires acknowledging both the complexities of 1953 and the catastrophic misjudgments of 1979. Sensible observers must reject selective myth-making and confront the real lessons. Time to call out the myth and learn from history — before these leftists aka useful idiots enable the next monster.
